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Introductionand Sunmarv
This paper deals with the links between thedevelopmentof new drugs,
andparticularly of innovative new drugs, and the international activities
of U.S. drug companies. While U.S. drug companies have developed new
production processes--the most notable being the fermentation process for
making penicillin——we concentrate in this paper on new products. Since pro-
1 duction costs comprise less than LQ percent of the selling price of drugs
and since the person choosing the drug rarely pays for it,2 growth in company
sales andprofitscomes more from introducing new products than from cutting
costs andpricesof old products.3
The main novelty of ourstudyis our examination of "innovative" as
contrasted with "imitative" new drugs. Previous studies have generally
focussed on the total number of new drugs produced each year, but since
1For example, in 1973 materials andproduction costs were 36 percent
of Merck's sales of $1.1 billion. Marketing and administrative expenses
comprised 29 percent, research and development expenses were 8 percent, and
profits before taxes were 28 percent of sales. Merck gCo.1973 Annual
Report. Materials arid production costs were 3L percent of Miles' 1973 sales
of $348 miflion. Miles Laboratories 1973 Annual Report. As discussed in
Section III, Merck is a very "innovative" drug company, and Miles is a
ex'y "imitative" drug company.
physician selects the drugs;thegovernment or aninsurancecompany
usually pays forit, atleast inthe U.S.and Western Europe.
3Foradiscussion of the stability of drug prices, see Michael H.Cooper,
Prices and Profits in the Phaaceutical Industry (New York: Pergamnon Press,
1966),Ch.3.
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our'interest is in the causes and consequences of innovation, we have con-
centrated on the products we have rated as innovative. Section I explains
our criteria for this distinction and presents our enumeration of the innova-
tive new drugs for each of the 22 companies in our sample from 1963 through
1972.
In Section II we discuss trends in the rate of drug innovation and the
factors influencing those trends. We conclude that while the 1962 changes
in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did produce an increase in research costs,
there were other influences acting in the same direction, particularly the
exhaustionofthe 'stock of knowledge previously accumulated over a period
ofyears.
Section IIIdescribesoursampleof drug companies aridcharacterizes
themwith respectto their size, research investment,andinnovativeness.
Allthe available measures of irinovativeness, which can be divided into
those measuring inputs and those measuring outputs, are flawed to some
degree. Those we consider indicators of output, such as the ratio of inno—
vativedrugsalesto total drugsales,arepositivelycorrelated with each
other, and also with measures of the quality of new drugs, such as R&D
expenditures per new drug or sales per new drug introduced. However, they
arenotrelated to the frequently used indicators of input, such as the
ratio of R&D expenditures to sales, and they arenegativelyrelated to
whatwerefer to as measures of R&D efficiency, such as R&D expenditures
er dollar of sales of new drugs.
Section1V examines the relation of innovativeness to the foreign
activities of individual firms.Weconjecture that the more innovative0
drugcompanies were less likely to open up new foreign manufacturing
subsidiaries in the 1960's; the regressions reported in Section IV are
consistent with thisconjecture.Lackofdata for oursanpleprecludes
our testing a corollary of this conjecture: that the moreinnovative
drugcompanies are. more likely to serve foreign markets via exporting
from the U.S. and via licensing.
•.InSection .V we analyze, for a sample of 7 new drugs introduced by
tbo companies,the rate at which use of the drugswas diffused among
various countries arid the impact of the presence of manufacturing plants
on the rate of diffision. Our results hint that the lag between first introduction
ofa new drugand its introduction into a particular country tended to be
shorterif there were a U.S.-owned manufacturing affiliate in that country
andif the drug werean innovative one.
Weshould makeexplicit that our results,by themselves, donot in-
dicate the economic benefits to either the U.S. or foreign countries of
theactivities of these companies. To estimate such benefits, one would
need to look also at the prices of individual drugs in various markets;
forexample, an "imitative" drug sold at a cheaper price than an "innovativ&'
drug may greatly benefit theconsuner)
1Anyestimateof such benefits depends on one's values andcannot,
becausewe aredealingwith new products, be derived fromtheanalysis of
formalwelfareeconomics. This analysis assumes thatat each point in time
consumerscould purchase, perhaps at a very high price, any product. How-
ever, nobody, for example, could purchase penicillin or its equivalent in
the 1920's. "The introduction of new things is more serious. Indeed,
they cannot be introduced into the analysis at all." I.H.D. Little, A
Critique of Welfare Economics(O>fordUniversity paperback, 1960),p.39.—5—
I. InputandOutput Measures of the Flowof Innovation
Any manufacturing firm can be thought of as producing goods of at
leasttwodifferentkinds: on the onehand, a specific industrial commodity,
and onthe other hand,aflow of minor andmajorinnovations which eventually
find their way into the product turned out by the firm or into the produc-
tion process used for such p'poses. This flowof innovations can be
looked at both in terms of the resources its gestation actually absorbs
or, alternatively, in terms of the specific units of output which emerge
fromtheknowledge-creation section of the firm.1
1The lack of an explicitdepartment engaged in RCDactivities is not
enoughevidence on which to argue that any given firm does not produceany
new knowledge. A great deal of knowledge new to the firm, and subsequent
minor and/or major technological changes at the plant level,emerge either
asa by—product of production, or as a consequence of technical activities
performed by the engineering sections of the firm which normally receive
namessuch as 'Trouble-shooting' or 'Technical assistance to production'
departments. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that a large fraction of
theobserved total factor productivity growthof any given plant has to do
preciselywith the application of incremental knowledge coming fromsuch
sources. See, in this respect: S. 1-lollander, The Sources of Increased
Efficiency. A Study of the Dupont Rayon Plants (Cambridge, 1966; MIT Univer-
sityPres3); R. Shishko, "Technological Change Through Product Improvement
inAircraft Turbine Engines" (Rand Corp., Monograph 1061,May 1973); G. E.
Box,"Some GeneralCcnsiderationsin Process Optimization," JournalofBasic
Eng5neerinc,No. 82(March 1960);J.Katz, Importacion de Tecnologia,
dizje e Industrializacjon Deendiente (Bs.As. Forthcoming, rondo deCultura,
1974).—6-
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Measuresof the input into innovation include data on R&D expenditure
or manpower figures on the size of the R&D operation plusotherknowledge-
creationactivities performed within thefirm. Output measures of the flow
ofinnovationin the context of the pharmaceutical industry might be:
(1) Number of compounds synthesized, (2) Number of new product candidates,
(3) Patents filed, (4) Written scientific monographs, (5) NDA's (Ne.' Drug
Applications), (6) IND's (Investigative new drug applications), (7) Sales
value of new products, (8) Nurthers or sales of pa.rticularly innovative
products.
Conceptual and statisticaldifficulties in empirical research in this
fieldare: a) Where to draw the line between R&D activities and those
other knowledge-creation activities also performed by the firm1 and b) How
to take into account quality changes which obtain with the passage of time?
The first of these set of problems is associated with input measures of
innovation,the second set with outputmeasures. Let us briefly exanine
• some of these problems.
1Surveys on contemporary R&D expenditures in the U.S. and in Eupe
• are currently carried out by NSF and OECD respectively. The instruction
manuals distributed by both agencies indicating what and how to measure as
R&D expenditt'e are far from being conclusive concerning the so-called
"Associated Technical Activities" also performed by the firm. See, for
example,NSF, a) Research andDevelopment in Industry (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, June 1968), in particular p. 125 with the
instructions for R&D measurement; b) OECD, Proposed Standard Practice 0
forSurveysof R&D, Doc. DAS/PD/62.47, Paris, 1966.—7—
Besides carrying out explicit R&D activities, manufacturing firms
alsoperform other technical jobs such as: process development arid pilot
plant production, quality control, clinical evaluation, research and develop-
ment carried out with the purpose of assisting other areas of the firmsuch
as patenting, medical informnatio, etc. The accounting treatment of expendi-
tures in these activities varies widely among pharmaceutical firms. It
'therefore follows that inter-firm differences in R&D expenditure should be
expected and that such data should be handled in a cautious way. The recent
study by the National Economic Development office (NEDO) on the British
pharmaceutical industry presented valuable information on this respect. It
shows that. .themajority of clinical evaluation was invariably included
in R&D and the majority of quality contl was excluded."' Such uniform
practice, however, was not found to prevail in relation to process develop-
ment and pilot plant production. "Thus, the only really significant varia-
tion in accounting practices appears to relate to process development and
pilot plant production. .. exclusionwhich could possibly lead a company to
understate its R&D expenditure by as much as 15%.t,2
Moreover, quality considerations are difficult to incorporate when
dealing with input measures of the flow of innovation. Presumably we
could speak of R&D personnel of various different levels and abilities
and about scientists of different calibre, but the economists' tool-box
is still poorly furnished to handle questions of this sort. SurrE'narizing,




thoughR&D expenditure data are normally employed a a 'proxy' variable
forinnovative effort,their potential hazards should be kept in mind.
Inter-firmdifferences in accounting practices can he rightly suspected,
andchanges in thequality of the knowledge-creation process which do take
placethrough timeareonly imperfectly captured.
Output measures of the flow of innovation are also far from being
faultless. On the one hand, some firms synthesize all the compounds they
test, while yet other firms buy from third parties a great dealof the
compounds they study. Similarly, a new product brought to the market can
be the result of internal R&D activities, but can also betheoutcome of
license, thus not being a true indicator of internal knowledge-creation
processes. On the other hand, qualitydifferentials amongproducts, patents,
scientific papers, etc., are clearly present, making it a ratherheroic
assi.mptiontowork with straight counts of these variables as if they were
homogeneous entities.
Consider briefly the differential quality of some of the various
indicators mentioned before. The number of compounds actuallysynthesized
byany given firm greatly depends on the approach such afirm has towards
valuable discussion ofthispoint in relation to the usefu.inoss
ofpatent statistics can be found in Chapter 2 of J. Schmookler's book,
Invention and Economic Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, lg66).
The value of scientific papers as a 'proxy' for the rate of innovation is
examined by R. Evenson and Y.Kislev,"Research aridProductivityin Wheat
andMaize"(New Haven: mimeo, 1972); see also Derek de Solla Price,
"Measuriug the Size of Science," Proceedings of the Israeli Academy of
ences, 1969.—9-
R&Dactivities. The mcre 'rational' the R&D strategy, i.e., "based on
theoretical biological propositions that certain types of compounds should
beexpected to demonstrate a certain type •of pharmacological activity,"1
the smaller the nurbcr of synthesized corripomds to be expected. Contrariwise,
the more random the screening, the larger the number of compounds actually
handled. Thus, inter-comany differences in researchstrategyqualify the
usefulness of the numberocompounds synthesized by each firm as an adequate
'proxy' for inter—firm differences in innovation. Similarly, and as a con-
sequence of the fact that a great deal of cross—licensing takes place in
this market,inter-firmdifferences in the number of new products brought
to the market might not be a good 'proxy' variable either.
There were large inter-firm differences in the propensity to patent,
with size and nationality appearing as the principal determinants of these
differences.2 Thus, also the numberofpatents filed byeach company should
beused in a very cautious way as a 'proxy' for the firms' innovative
1lnnovativeActivity in the Pharmaceutical Indust, op.cit., p. 15.
D. Reekie has recently shown that "Continental and particularly
German companies appear to file more patents in Britain than their record
of conmercially successful innovations would have led one to expect." Also
that "...very largefirmstended to file fewer patents in relation to expendi-
ture on R&D thansmallercompanies." W. D. Reekie, The Economics of
tiLlwithSDecial Reference to the Pharmaceutical Industry (Unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of Strathclyde, 1969). A similar finding has been reported




NDAsu isicns also have problems of their own. A growing rateof
trition--and what's more, unknowninter-firmdifferences in the rate of
attrition——Castsome doubt uponthe use of NDA'sas anindication of the
actualinnovative effort performed by the firm. Finally,the number of
:oductcandidates, or the number of IND applications, have been singled
out by industry officials as probably the best 'proxy' for the variable
wewantto measure, but such data are not published by pharmaceutical
companiesand arenot available for detailed examination. The FDA-—the
onlygovernment agency with ready access to such information--doesnot
provide company figures in thisrespect.2
Somuch then for possiblepublicly available quantitatie indicators
fthcflow of innovation. Itshouldbe noted that none of the previously
enti'ned 'proxy' variables takes into account quality differentials which
presumably exist amongproducts,patents, NDA's, IND's, etc. Quality
See,for example, H. C.Grabowsky, "The Determinantsof Industrial
.DA Study of the Chemical, Drug and Petroleum Industries," Journal of
po.liLica: :coromv (1973). Also,W. S.ComanorandF.M. Scherer, "Patent
Statistics as a Measure of Technical Change," Journal of Political Economy,
(May l95); 1). ..Mueller,"Patents, Research andDevelopmentand the Measure-
iontof Inventive Activity," Journal of Industrial Economics (November 1966).
2•H.Clymer has recently claimed that ".. .theFDA has shed little
..ight on this all important question, for they do not separate IND'sfor
li:ical investigation of new chemical agents from all the rest of the mish—
ns! of IND's that must be filled prior to undert&ing other types of clinical
I.-11-
differentials canbe captured through chemical evaluation and fromclinical
ortherapeutic inve3tigation of each specific drug. Whereas in the first
case the molecular structure of any given drug has to be examined in order
to decide whether or not such molecular structure has been previously used
by the industry, in the second case judgment has to be passed at the clinical
and therapeutic level, considering for such purposes whether or not the drug
introduced identifiable advances over pre-existing substitutes. We have
attempted to evaluateinnovation througha selective pharmacologic assessment
of 196 single entity drugs produced by 22 major U.S. firms between 1963 and
1972. The Paul de Haen New Drug Analyses and Nonproprietary Name Index were
usedas primary sources for the listing of new drugs marketed in the U.S.
during this ocriod.
Oursampleconsists of the22U.S.drugcompanies that meteither of
thefollowing criteria: (.1) U.S.drug salesin1972 were in excess of
$70million or (2) the company first marketed inthe u.s. at least four
singleentity drugsbetween1963 and1972.1We include 19 companies under
the first criterion andthree(Armour, Dow, andU.S.V.)under the second.
trials." See Clymer, "TheEconomicsandRegulatoryClimate of U.S.and
OverseasImpact Trends" (Paper read atthe Conferenceon Drug Development
•nd Marketing, the American Enterprise InstituteforPublic Policy Re-
search, Washington, July 197k),p. 22.
1Wetreat Parke-Davis, which was acquired by Warner-Lambert in 1970,
asa separate company and consider only the Schering part of Schering—Plough.
Appendix TabeA-i showsthe subsidiaries we included for each company.
I.-12-
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Asshown inTableI-i, these 22 corpanies accountedfor about75 percent
ofthe 1972 drugsalesin the U.S. by all U.S. companies and about 49 percent
ofthe new drugs (including vaccines, diagnostics, and vitamins)introduced
intothe U.S. by U.S. companies between 1963 and 1972. As shown in Table1-2,
the new drugs (excluding vaccines, diagnostics, and vitamins) introduced by
tese 22 companies, as a share of aU new drugs introduced in the U.S., rose
from 4percentin 1963-1967 to 51 percent in 1968—1972.
A "proprietary product" usually does not require a prescription, has a
brandname,and is advertised to the public.1 An "ethical pharmaceutical"
is promoted primarily to the medical, pharmacy, and allied professions and
includes both prescription and non-prescription products. One should note
tht adrugwhich does not require a prescription in the U.S. may require
cieinsome other countries; conversely, some drugs requiring a prescription
in the U.S. may not require onein some foreign countries. A "non-proprietary"
drug, sometimes called a "generic" drug, does not involve a trade name. So
a prescription drug could be either proprietary ornon-proprietary.Finally,
onemust distinguish a "drug" from "cosmetics," "toiletries ,"and"medical
onc urgica1 supplies."
For our purposes,we have defined a "drug" as a single chemical entity
belonging to a chemical class which exerts amajorpharmacologic actionon
people (e.g., diuretic, analgesic, ataraxic, antihistamiriic, etc.). We have
Ourdefinitions in this paragraph are based on those of the Pharinaceu-
ticalManufacturers Association, Fact Book 1973(Washington,1973).
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Table I-i
Relative Importance of 22 Companies




22 U.S.drug companies 3,331 254 485
Other U.S. drugcompanies 1,176 198 443
TotalU.S. companies 4,507 452 928
.3 Foreign drug companies 86LL 52 103
GrandTotal 5,371 504 1,031
1lncludingdrugs already being sold inthe U.S. byanother firm.
2Single entities andcombinations.Includes vaccines, diagnostics, and vitamins.
3Astra, Beechem, BurroughsWelcome, E. Fougera, CIBA—Geigy, Hoeshst,
Hofftan-LaRoche, ICIAmerica,Knoll, Organon, Pharinacia, Philips Roxane, -
Sandoz-Wander,Syntex.
4Atwholesale prices.Includesvitaminsandnon-prescriptiondrugs.
Source: Column(1)-- basedon data fromIMSAmerica; Columns (2)and(3)--
NewDrug Analvis U.S.A. 19E-lS72 andNew DrugAnalysis U.S.A. l93-l9B(NewYork: PauldeHaen5.—12b-
C)
Table1-2
New Single Entityarid CombinationDrugs Introduced in U.S.
Sainple•of (1)1(2)
22 Companies Industry percent
(1) (2)
.958—1962 601 1,241 48
1963—1967 280 630 44
1968—1972 205 401 51
1958 156 370 42
1959 135 315 43
1960 141 306 46
1961 92 260
. 35
1962 77 250 31
153 90 199 45
1964 60 157 38
1965 55 112 49
1966 30 80 38
.1967 45 82 55
1968 51 87 59
1963 34 62 55
970 41 105 39
.1971 47 83 57
1972 32 64 50
Source: Various issues of New Products Parade, Annual Review of New Drugs
(New York: Paul deHn).-13-
excludedcombination products (two or more chemicals), vitamins, vaccines,
and diagnostics.
The new drugs listed in the de Haen sources have been analyzed to
determine if they are innovative or novel products, or if they are imita-
tiveofpre-existing entities already marketed. Innovation has been assessed
throughan examination of both the pharmacologic action and the chemical
class or structure of the drug. Thus,the diuretic ethacrynic acid (Edecrin,
Merck,1967), a new chemical entity, isclassified as innovative because it
actson the kidney differently fromthe diuretic chiorothiazide (Diuril,
Merck,1957) even though it produces the same fundamental result, diuresis.
Modifications of pre-existing structures (additions or deletions of
chemicalgroups), although marketed asnew chemical entities, are iot neces-
sarily considered as innovative bythese criteria. These modifications
oftenenhance a drug's pharmacologic action and therapeutic effectiveness
while decreasing undesired side effects. However, the modified structure
is considered imitative of the original drug if it exerts the same basic
phrmaco1ogic effect and is marketed for the same therapeutic purpose.
Forexample, cyclothiazide (Anhydron, Lilly, 1963),althougha new potent
thiazide—type diuretic, is nevertheless similar in its chemical structure
andpharmacologicaction to chiorothiazide, andistherefore regaied as
imitativeby our definition. As another example, two of the most popular
drugsinthe U.S. and Europe, Librium and Valium(Roche),1 benzodiazepine
1Thisexample is illustrative, as Hoffman-LaRoche is e>:cluded from
our sample because it is a non-U.S. company.
ftranquilizers7 are very similar in chemical structureand havefuridaitentally
therepharmacologic effects. Thus, by the criteria developed here,
a.liurn, marketed in 1963, does not represent any significant pharmacologic
1—novationover its antecedent, Librium, which was marketedin 1960.
Thereare some cases, however, in which pharmacologicinnovation can
ce chicd by slight modification of a pre-existing drug.For exariple,
methotrimeprazine (Levoprone, Lederle, 1966) is a drug similarin structure
and effects to other tranquilizers of the henothiazineclass, such as
chlorprorrtazine(Thorazine, Smith Kline and French, 19514). However, the
analgesicpropertiesthat are present to a negligible degree in Thorazine
are greatly increased in Levoprome. Therefore, althoughof the same chemical
c1as,tc pharmacologic effects of Levoprome aresignificantly different
fromearlier phenothiazines to justify its rating as a pharmacologic innova-
tion by our definition.
It isthereforeseen that pharmacologic action, as well as cherr.ical
nD.elty, areevaluatedto determine innovation in pharmaceuticals. Each
drug was assigned1 to one of the following categories:(1) innovative,
'2) m.tatcs a drug of the same company marketed in the U.S. between1960
ari. 1972, (3) :.mitates a drug of another company marketed in the U.S.between
196f' arid 197?, (14)imitatesa drug of the same company marketed in the U.S.
1References included Goodman and Gilman, The Pharmacologic Easic of
Therapeutics; Cutting, Handbook of ?harnacclogy; Meyers,Jawitz and Goldfien,
Review of edical ?harncoioy; Wilson and Jones, American Drug index;
Lewis, Modern Drug Encycloncdia, 12th edition; Unlisted Drugs;A.M.A. tug
Lva.uations.
C-15—
-before1960, arid(5)imitates a drug of another company marketed in the
US. before 1960. For the purpcses.of this paper, we combine categories
(2) —(5)into a single imitative category.1
Theannual number of innovative and imitative drugs introduced by the
companies in our sample is shown in coluiins (1) and (2) of Table 1-3.
Table I—4 shows the innovative drugs for each company in our sample.
Carpenter2has evaluated new drugs for 1958-1967 interms of their
"chemical novelty," arid McVicker3has evaluated new drugs for 1960-1969
intermsof their "therapeutic advance." As these studies are unpublished,
we present only a surn'nary comparison of their results with ours for 1963-
1967. As shown in Table 1—5, we considered 30 of the 82 drugs introduced
in this period by these firms to be innovative, as compared to 36 for study
A and 20 for study B. The Chi-square coefficient for our evaluationis
13.L46when cc;pared with study A and 29.56 when compared with study B, which
indicatesthat at a significance level of less than ipercent, we cansay
that our evaluation is not independent of each of the other eva1uations.'
We havenottried to differentiate among different degrees of innova-
tivenessor of imitation.
Carpenter,"Innovation in Chemical Structure in a Group of 267
RecentlyMarketed Drugs" (mimeo, 1969).
3w.McVicker,"New Drug Development Study" (rnimeo, 1972).
Wenote that our evaluation was completed beforewe saw either study A
orstudy B.-iSa-
Table1-3
Number of New DrugsIntroducedin the U.S.




(1) (2) (3) (14) (5)
1963 7 10 18 60 78
19614 . 5 11 i7 38 55
1965 7 10 17 31 148
1966 2 5 7 20 27
1967 9 16 25 17 142
1958 2 17 19 18 37
1969 4 1]. 15 15 30
1970 5 20 25 13 38
1971 14 29 33 10 143
1972 3 17 20 10 30
Total 1146 196 232 1428
1 .
Includingdrugsalreadybeing sold in the U.S. by anotherfirm.
2Excludingvaccines, diagnostics, and vitamins.
3lncludes drugs whose classification is uncertain.
































































Comparison of Evaluations of DrugsIntroducedin












L Imitative 12 50 62
Total 30 52 82
Chi—square =29.56
1'-.16-
Finally1in Table 1-6 we show the number of innovative drugs introduced
in each of the first five yearsfollowingthe introduction of the Food and
Drug Amendments. None of the three studies shows anydownwardtrend.- I6a-
C
Table1-6
Number of Innovative Drugs
Introduced by 22 Firns
Cohen-Katz-Beck Study A Study B
(1) (2) (3)
1963 7 6 2
1g6L 5 8
1965 7 10 6
1966 2 k 2.
1967 9 9
Total 30 37 20
C—17-
II. Trendsin Pharmaceutical Innovation
Two kinds of observations areavailablefor studying drug innovations
and their relation to foreign investment: time series on new products, or
on various types of new products, and cross-sections of pharmaceutical
firms, some of which are active innovators andsomeof which are responsible
for few, if any, innovations. In this section we discuss the main trends
in the rate of pharmaceutical innovation.
Weshall concentrate here on three types of new products emerging
from drug firms. They are: a) New Single Chemical Entities, b) Duplicate
Products, and c) Combinations. The first itemiodicates products which are
newsingle chemicalagents,not previously marketed in the United States.
Duplicate productsare drugs which are offered as single chemical entities
and which are already sold by another manufacturer within the U.S. market.
Finally, a co'thination is a preparation consisting of twoormoreactive
ingredients.lle drug firms also produce such items as New Dosage Forms
(tablets, ampu.ls, solutions, etc.), Biologicals, andHospitalSolutions,
our study concentrates upon the three previously mentioned groups of cormr.odi-
ties. New chemical entities andduplicateproducts are classified by Paul
deHaen and donot always correspondto our distinction of innovative and
imitative, as developedin the previous Section.
TableIl-i. presents information regarding the number of Single Chemical
Entities, Duplicate Products, andCombinationsintroduced into the U.S.
market during the period 1950_1972.1 Using such data, Chart 1 describes
he data presented in Table 11-1 and Chart 1 come from
differentnumbers of Paul de Hae&s publication, New Products Parade, Annu.31
Review of New Drugs.We hereby thank Mr. de Haen for lettingus have access
to this valuable information.Table 11—1
New ProductIntroductions in the Ethical
Pharmaceutical Industry
1950—1972
TotalNew New Single Duplicate mbinations
Products Chemicals Products
I I
(1) (2) (3) (L1) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1950 326 28 100 198
1951 321 5147 35 63 714 j714 212 1410
1952 3114 961 35 98 77 251 202 612
1953 353 1314 48 146 79 330 226 838
1954 280 1694 38 184 87 417 255 1093
1955 403 2097 31 215 90 507 282 1375
1956 401 2498 42 257 79 586 280 1655
1957 1400 2893 51 308 88 674 261 1916
370 3258 1414 352 73 7147 253 2169
1959 315 3583 63 415 49 796 203 2372
1960 306 3889 45 1460 62 858 199 2571
1961 260 4149 39 1499 32 890 189 2760
1962 250 '4399 27 526 43 933 180 2940
1963 199 4598 16 542 34 967 149 3089
1954 157 4753 17 559 29 996 111 3200
1965 112 4867 23 582 18 1014 71 3271
1966 80 14947 12 594 15 1029 53 3324
1967 82 5029 25 619 25 1054 32 3356
1968 87 5116 11 630 26 1080 50 3406
1969 62 5178 9 639 22 1102 31 3437
1970 105 5283 16 655 50 1152 39 3475
2971 83 5366 114 669 40 1192 29 3505
172 614 5'430U 680 35 1227 18 3523
Source: Variousissuesof NewProducts Parade, Annual Review of New Drugs
(NewYork: Paul de Haen).-17b-
Chart 1
- _ACCU1A1flJWER OF NEWDRUGirTRODUCED ro
ThEUSA 1ART.1950-1972.(*)
(*)Source: Paul de Haen, Annual new product
parade. New York, (various issues)
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in a semi—logarithmic scale, the time path of the cumulated number of new
products in each one of the three above-mentioned categories. The year
1962, in which the U.S. Congress passed the so-called Xefauver-Harris Amend-
ments to the Food, Drug aridCosmeticAct which regulated the introduction
of new pharmaceuticals to the US. market, is distinguished in the chart.
The Amendments significantly changed the regulatory climate underlying the
operation of the pharmaceutical industry, andtheyneed to be taken into
accountas oneof the possible determinants o the observed declinein the
rateof new product introduction.
Both Table 11-1 and Chart ].providea distinct impression of a 1ong-ter
tailing off in the rate of new product introduction. This trend is certainly
present in all the series, but is more dramatic in Combinations than in
Single Entities. There appears to be a long-term relative shift away from
Combinations. Thus, we can observe both an absolute fall in the rate of
niproductintroductions and a change in relative composition within the
aggregate.
There is another sense in which the aggregate series for new product
introductionshas shown significant changes inits relative composition.
Thisis related to the rate of product innovation in specific therapeutic
classes. In many therapeutic areas in which well established arid useful
agents were already marketed, innovation practically dried up in the 1960's.
Comparing the nurr.ber of new drugs introduced in the U.S. in 1957-1962 with
963-1967, one finds a markeddecline for nine categories(antihistamines,
antitussives, aritispasmodics, muscle relaxants/antiparkinson drugs, thiazide-
type diuretics, sulfonamide antibacterials, aritiobesity drugs, corticosteroids,
arid antinau.seants),a slight decline for tranquilizers and psychostimulants,
e—19-
and no change for antibioticsand cancer cherrtotheraPydrugs.1 Thus, the
aggregatefall in new product introductionShides a dramatic abandonment
of manyareasof research and a gradual concentrationof efforts in a
smaller number of fields.
Atleast two different explanationshave been offered for this long-
term decline in the rate of new productintroductions. On the one hand,
industry officialsandsome members of the academiccommunityhaveblamed
the fall in the rate of productinnovation entirely cn the FDA and the1962
Amendments.
"I conclude from these data that:a) The 1962 Amend-
inents significantly reduced theflow of newchemical
entities and, what is perhaps moreinteresting, b)
that all of the observed differencesbetween the pre-
andpost—1962New Chemical Entities flowcan be
attributed to the 1962AmendmentS."2
On the other hand,ithas been suggested that the rateof innovation has
1Barry M. Bloom, "The Rate of Contemporary DrugDiscovery," Lex et
Scienta, 8 (January—March 1971), p. L•
Peltnan,"The Benefitsand Costs of New Drug Regulation,"ed.
R. L. Landau, Regulatifl ew Dru,s
(Publication of Center for Policy Study,
Chicago University Press, 1973), p.126.
)ther authors have presented essentiallythe same,thoughless
extreme, diagnosis of what is going onin the industry.Company
officials are particularlyinclinedto take this line of reasoning. See,
forexarp1e, Harold A.Clymer from Smith Kline & French,"The Economic and—20—
•0
slowedbecause the pharmaceutical industry hasexhausteda stock of know-
ledge that took some timetoexploit.
"Despite allefforts,useful results nowadays arerarer
andrarer,andsomedrughouses have to face the problem
ofhow longit will be possible for them to supporttheir
researchdepartments....My first prediction is that, like
other golden ages, the golden age of drugs will not return,
and never again will so many new and efficient drugs be-
come available within such a short period as during the
fifties and sixties."1
A similar view is expressed by de Haen. "...traditional methods in new
drug development seem to be impeded and less fruitful....we have reached
a temporary plateau of knowledge in new drug development because so much
has been made in the short span of 30 years."2
Regulatory Climate--U.S. andOverseas"(Paper presentedat the Conference
onDrug Development and Marketing: Aspects of Public Policy, American
Enterprise Institute, Washington, July 1974). Also, the very valuable
paper by Dr. L. H. Sarett,fromMerck, "FDA Regulations and Their Influence
on Future RED," Research Management (March 1974).
1T. Gross, "Future Drug Research, Drugs of theFuture," Clinical
PharmacologyandTherapeutics, 14 (January 1973), pp. 1, 2, £.
2 ,, • P.deHaen,Pharmaceutca.1 Research, New York State Journal of
Medicine, 72 (October 1972), p. 4.It should be noted that this last view
of the long-term growth process of the industry has quite a distinctive
classical flavour and dcscribesascenario wnich is by no means novel to the— 21-
Morelikely than not, both of these views can claim a certain degree
of explanatory power,1 their relativesignificance/aryingasbetween thera-
peutic classe.2 Both theories would predict and be compatible with: a)
A prominent escalation of product research and developmentcosts, b) A
marked lengthening of product development times, and c) An increased level
of uncertainty in new drug development.3 Let us briefly consider these
economics profession. As far back as 1930, S. Kuznets developed the idea
of an eventual exhaustion of an industry's inventive potential-—which in his
view obtains when the industry's techniques aptroach a certainplateau of
perfection——which in turn leads to a retardation of the rate of technical
progress and, eventually, to a tendency for output to describe an S-shaped
curvethroughtime.Hecalled that the Law of Industrial Growth. See, S.
Kuznets, Secular 4overentsin Production and Prices (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin,1930). The same causal nechanism has been later re—discovered by
W.E.G. Salter in his Productivity arid TechnicalChange (Cambridge: Cambridge
UniversityPress, 1960).
1See Martin NeilBaily, "Research and Development Costs and Returns:
TheU.S. Pharmaceutical Industry," Journalof PoliticalEconomy, Vol. 80
(January/February 1972), p. 77.
one uses supply and demand analysis, one could say the FDA regulations
impose "a tax" on the development of new drugs and the.exhaustjori of knowledge
reflectsan upward shiftin the supply curve. Increased expenditures on
medical caresuggestanupward shift in the demand for all drugs. For a
supplyand demand analysis, ignoring "taxes,"seeN. Rosenberg, "Science,
Invention and Economic Growth," Economic Journal, 84 (March l97L),pp.90-108.
3Theinference isfrequently made that increased development costs or
ILL
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threeaspects, which pretty much reflectthe contemporary trends underlying
the innovative process of the pharmaceutical industry.
Consider first research and development costs. Theavailable evidence
indicates that these have been rocketing upwards atthe incredible pace of
about30percent per annum. "The industry was getting anew chemical entity
in the 1950's for 1.5 million dollars of R&D. Todayit is costing between
3.0 and20$US million andevenmore."1 Increases in R&D costs havenot
resulted exclusively from increasedresearch 'equirements imposed under the
1962airendnents. From 1951 to 1962 research and developmentcosts per single
nechemical entity grew at the rapid pace of 20 percent per annum.Research
and development in drugs is becoming anincrecing1yexpensive propociticn
throughtimepart-J-y because science and research todayis morerigorousthan
adecade(or two) ago.2 It 5snotclear how we can isolate how much of the
the lengthening of the development times result fromFDA increased require-
ments prior to approval. Though this is c1dr1y so.there icnothingto
precludethe possibility that suchfeatures also result from research gradu-
au)shiftingtowards more complexan time consuming therapeutic fields
asa consequence of the exhaustion of the profit potential(and intellectual
attraction)of more conventional therapeutic areas. Such aneffect might
bepresent quite independently of increased regulatorymeasures.
3V. A. Mund, "The Return on Investment of the Innovative Pharmaceutical
Firm," ed. J. I). Cooper, The Econoiics of DrugInnovation(Washington:
American University, 1970), p. 130.
2H. A. Clymer, "The Changing Costs and Risks of Pharmaceutical Innova-
tion," ed. J. D. Cooper, op. cit., p. 121. "Perhaps moreinteresting is
the fact tbt our methodolor is superior to what it was only a few years
I—23—
increasedcosts in new drug development is due to amore advanced(and more
expensive) knowledge-creation process andhowmuchofit is a consequence
of imposed new standards by the FDA.
Thereare indicationsthat rising U.S. costs of drug development and
declining rates of innovation are not solely a consequence of changes in
FDA regulations, since the same phenomena have been noted in Europe, which
isnot directlyaffected by such regulations. After studying the British
case, Cooper finds that:
"Since 1951 a six-fold increase in expenditure has
yieldedhalf as many drugs perunit expenditure (This
statementapplies to the U.S. case). This has been
blamed ontheFDA and its slowness in giving clearance
to new drugs, but the findings of the last chapter, and
the fact that this tendency is certainly equally true
throughout Europe, cast some doubt ontheclaim that
this is the sole reason. Itis probablythat the world
awaitsthe next major therapeutic advances which are
likelyto be in the cancer or cardio-vascu.lar fields."1
ago. Our science is more rigorous, morelikelyto find hazards inan
experimentalcetnpound."
1M.H. Cooper,op. cit., p.178—2 e-
TheEuropean scene in general shows pretty much a similartrend. Data
recently published by Paul de Hacn indicate that: "Marketingof newly
synthesized drugs in England, France, Germany and Italy hasdeclined over
aneleven-year period. For the period 1960-1965 marketingof 521 drugs
has been recorded, and for the period 1966-1971 only 3 drugs havebeen
counted."1 TheEuropean trend receives independent confirmation froma
studywhich found a drop in the number of new discoveries through the
1960's.2
Atleast four important consequences follow from the rapidly increasing
researchand development costs demanded for new drugintroduction.First,
fewer firms arenow able tomaintain their innovative effort. Whereas 89
companiesintroduced new pharmaceutical products in 1963,only 33didso
inl972. Second, the number of research and developmentprojects effectively
pursued by anygiven company has tended tofall.4 Third, research aimed at
1Paulde Haen, NewProducts Parade, Annual Review of New Drugs (New
York: mimeo,February 1973), p. 15.
2E. Reis-Arndt andD.Elvers, "Results of Pharrna Research. New Phar-
rndceuticalAgents1961-1970," Drugs Made in Germany, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1972,
A.ilenuorf.Also P. deHaen, "Pharmaceutical Research," New York State
Journalof edicine, 72(October 1972), p. 2536.
3P. de Haen, NewProduct Parade, various issues,op. cit.
4 . Dr.L. h. Sarett, Director of MerckResearch Labs,says: In our own
laboratories,for example, the number of research projects has dropped 10%
from1969 tothe present year." L. H. Sarett,"FDA Regulations and Their
Influenceon FutureRCD," Research Management(March 197). 0
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"me too" drugs has significantly declined, as previous evidence (in Table
11-1)on the introduction of Duplicate Products has already shown. Finally,
R&D resources aregraduallybeing reallocated away from the U.S. and brought
into operation elsewhere, particularly in the UK, France, Germany and Italy.1
The available evidence indicates an upward trend in drug deveLpment
times. At the end of the 1950's, the time span from the selection ofa
product candidate to the filing for regulatory approval was estimated at
abouttwoyears. By the middle 1960's, this same period had gone up to
about four years, andduring the early 1970's, industry officials already
spokeofseven to eight years.2
Finally, not only did R&D costs and development time increase during
the last decade, but the uncertainties andrisksunderlyingnew drug de-
velopment rosepanpassu with the former two. The attrition rate of ccpour.ds
enteringthe development process, i.e.,having passed the filingofan IND
(investigational new drug application) and entering into clinical trials,
isfrequently used by the industry as an indicator for risk and uncertainty.
The evidence shows that the attrition rate has been going up or, in other
words, that a growing number of compounds are falling by the way somewhere
Letween the sta't of human trials (transfer of animaldatato humans) and
3 thesubmission of an NDA (new drug application).
A. C].ymer, "The Economic andRegulatoryClimate——U.S. and Overseas
Impact Trends," on. cit.
2The evidence in thisrespect comes from L. H. Sarett, op. cit.
3H. A. Clymer in hispaper, "The Changing Costs and Risks of Pharma-
ceutica.]. Innovation," OD._cit., gives statistical information concerning the
rate of attrition. Whereas in 1965, 32% of the IND filed during that same—26-
Sunarizing, wecan say that both thecost andtimcof new drug develop-
ment arerapidlyincreasing through time and so alsoarethe uncertainties
andrisks which underlie the process of innovation in this area of manufac-
turing. Industrial firms presumably react in different ways to these struc-
tural trends. Some of them might decide to drop the innovitive race alto-
gether. Yet others might try to concentrate on fewer research projects.
While some companies will probably increase their efforts at the marketing
end of the spectrum, reducing their cormnitments to basic research, other
companieswill do just the opposite and invest moreheavily in more basic
research.1Some companies might trytocompensate for their inability to
gri thxvugh new product introductions in the U.S. market by giving priority
to foreign markets, or to industrial diversification. One specifip aspect
of these behavioral differences is to he explored later on in Section IV
of this paper, where :e shall trytoexplain the number of foreign subsidi-
arics opened up by each drug company during the l960', using the relative
quality of the firm's portfolio of new products as an independent variable.
°rhadbeen terminated, &42% of these same filings had been terminated by
h nd ef 19, ad 53% by the end of 1968. "We have taken a look at the
SKFrecord of IND'sfiled duringthe last five years and findthat 70%
never reached the NDA stage. It is too earlyto know theexact fate of
those still active. However, myguesswould be that only about one in ten
of those that started will reach the market," p. 120.
3Thereare clear indicationsthat someofthese trends areverymuch
among usalready.Hoffman-LaRochc, Lilly, andZierck haveinrecentyears
adopted aaviercornitment towardsbasicresearch activities, developing
f.—27—
iii. Characteristics ofU.S. Drug Firms
Asdiscussedin Section I, our sample consists of 22 U.S. drugcompanies.
The main characteristics of these 22 companies aredescribed in Table 111-1.
We use as a measure of company size inthis industry total U.S. drug sales.
Total U.S. sales of the parent company areincluded on the possibility that
investment behavior is related to the sizeof the firm as a whole. The
numbersof R&D personnel irlaboratoriesdevoted to pharmaceutical research
andestimatedR&D expenditures for pharmaceutical research aremeasures of
research input, while numbers andsalesof new drugs, single entity drugs,
andinnovativedrugs are measures of R&D output.Promotional expenses are
includedas a possible alternative or supplementto R&D investment as a
source of sales.
Our use of 1972 sales of new or innovative drugsmight be thought to
bias this measre against companies that developeddrugs early in our period,
if the use of these drugs had run its course by1972. Table 111-2 tests
this possibility by comparing 1972 sales for drugsintroduced at different
dates. If there is any bias, rather than onlychance variation or the
results of a rise in the cost of successfulinnovation, it seems to be in
the opposite direction. It is the earliest years'innovations that may be
disproportionately represented in 1972 sales.Perhaps the most recent innova-
tions had not yet reached theirpeaks in sales in1972 and the innovativeness
of recently successful ccmpanie5 may thereforebe understated.
special centers for this purpose. Thereis no doubt that diversification
towards cosmetics, pesticides (or evenbreweries!) is presently going on



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































— £I àJ —
Notesto Table 111-1
SOUflCES: Col. (1) —Moody'sIndustrials, various issues.
Cols. (2)-(4) —basedon data from IMS America.
Col. (5) —DrugStatistical Handbcok(Washington:FDA, l)73).
Cols. (6) and (7) —basedon data in various publications
of Paul de Haen, Inc.
col. (8) —seeSection I.
Col. (9) —Industrialesearch Laborathrjes ofthe United
States, 13th ed. (New York: R.R. Bowker Co., 1970)
Col. (10) —totalsfrom financial statements multipled by
ratios of pharmaceutical to total R&D personnel from same source as col. (9).
a
Promotional expenses for 1970. Includes expendituresfor advertising
in professionaljournals,directmailing, and detail man.
b
Totalsales are for Greyhound Corporation, parentof Armour.
C
Totalsalesare for American Cyanamid,parentof Lederle.
d











Abbott .2 .3 .5
AmericanHome Products 3.9 3.6 .1





•2 1 Johpson & Johnson S
Lederle .3 .9 1.3
Lilly 12.3 S3. 3.1.4
Merck . 12.3 .8 —2
2 1 Miles 0 S
Parke-Davis 1.0 2.7 .7
Pfizer S3. 10.9 2.4
2 2 Richardson—Merrell — .7 —
A.H. Robins S1 .7 .9
2 2
Searle 14.1 — —
Schering-Plough 10.0 4.8 —2
Smith Kline & French .9 0 .7
Squibb 0 3.3 2.8
Sterling 3.2 6.9 —2
Upjohn 10.4 1.0 1.9
u.r.. .1 1.6 .6
Warner-Lanthert s1 .1 -2
1Suppressed because only one new drug.
drugintroduced.
Source:Based on IMS America data.—28—
Anwnberofpossible indicators of innovativeness and related charac-
teristicsof companies arelistedin Table111-3.R&D expenditures and
personnel per dollar of total drug sales areindicatorsof R&D effort.
R&D expenditures and personnel per new or innovative drug introduced can
bethought of a indicatorsof the investment in each new drug, and thus
possiblyof the quality of the companies' innovations. Ratios of new or
innovative drug sales tototal drug sales, of innovative to total new drug
sales,or of nubers of single entity orinnovative drugs to total new drugs
introduced are all indicators of the output from R&D input. The two other
measures, R&D expenditures and personnel per dollar of new drug sales, are,
possibly, indicators of the efficiency of the R&D effort, or the extent to
which it is aimed at objectives other than innovation or riew.drug production.
We refer to these as indicators because they aremostly imperfect
proxies for the characteristics they aresuoposed to measure. The invest-
ment per drugaridper dollar of drug sales shouldbe measured by relating
the input of R&D to the particular drugs produced by that input, or at
least to the drugs produced by inputs preceding their introduction.Our
outputmeasures relate to 196 3-72 or to 1972 alone whileour inputdata are
forsingle years, 1969 and1971.The relevant inputs for some of these
outputs may havebeen madein the early 1960's, andinany case the outputs
•are not the product of single year's input. The R&D data should refer to
ethical drugsonly,but we were not able to exclude inputs for proprietary
drugs. The R&D expenditure data, in fact, refer to whole companies, rather
than to pharmaceutical portions of them, andwe hadto assumethat the


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the division of R&D personnel.
Some indication of the relationships amongthese indicators is given
byTable III—4 which showsthesimple correlations between each pair.
Those we describe above as relating to outputfrom R&D are positively
correlated with each other, although notclosely in all cases. The output
measuresarenotrelated in anyclearway to the indicators ofresearch
effort. R&D expenditures andpersonnelper new drugintroduced,which we
calledan indicatorof the quality of new drugs, are positively related to
theoutput indicators. On the other hand, R&D expendituresandpersonnel
per dollarof new drugsalesare'negatively related to the quality and
output indicators, a result which suggeststhat there may be an efficiency
factor involved. High R&D per new drug is associatedwith high sales per
new drug and with high shares of new drugsin total sales and innovative
drugsin new drugsales,or, inother words, with success in innovation.
HighR&D perdollar of new drug sales is associated with low sharesof new
orinnovative drugs, which we might interpret as lack of successin innova-
tionor an indication that forthese companies R&D is not devoted to
innovation.
-
Fromthe data in Table 111-3 we can judge whether the companiesfall
Into natural groupings which may reflect different researchstrategies.
We have used the ratio of sales of innovative drugs, by ourdefinition, to
sales of all drugs in 1972 as o.ir most logical indicatorof innovativefless,
andhaveseparated the firms, by this criterion, into four mostinnovative,
sixofmedium innovativeness, andeightleast innovative. Table 111-5 shows







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1Newdruq sales as % of total U.S. drug sales, 1972 48.5 32.6 16.9
2 Innovative drug sales as $ of U.S. drug sales, 1972 25.2 7.8 1.4
3 Innovative drug sales as % of new drug sales, 1972 60.7 30.1 9.9
4 No. of sinqie entity new drugs as % of all new druqs,
1963—72 56.0 57.3 43.8
5 No. of innovative druqs as % of new druas,1963—72 24.5 18.3 10.5
6No. ofinnovative drugs as % of sinale entities,
1963—72 39.2 31.8 25.0
7Averagerank by above measures 5.]. 7.5 13.1
R&D Effort
8 R&D expenditures (1971) per $of U.S. drug sales
(1972) 18.7 17.4 18.8
9 R&D peronncl (199) pr $otU.!.drug sules (1972) 6.1 4.]. 6.3
çualityof RDor'!ew r)ruqs
10 R&Dexoenditures (1971) per new drug introduced
(1963—72) 2.9 2.51 1.1
1]. R&D personnel (1969) per new drug introduced
(1963—72) 77.8 42.3 361
12 R&D expenditures (17l)pernew single entity drug
introduced (13—72) 4.8 5.4 3.2
13 R&D personnel(1E9)er new sinqic entity drug
introduccd (1963-72) 152.9 129.5 106.9
R&D Ffficicricv
14R&Dc::penditures (1971) per $100 U.S. sales of new
elrugs (1972) 48.0 54.6 127.2
.15 R&D.personnel(1969) per $ U.S. sales of new drugs
(1972) . 13.1 15.3 40.1
Size
16U.S. drug sales, 1972 ($ million) 219.8 196.7 117.2
SOURCE:Table III- 3.
a




With one exception, the ratio of single entities to all new drugs,
the indicators we describe as measuring innovativeness, and the average
ranking of these indicators, vary appropriately with our preferred measure.
* Thefirms that are most innovative by that standard are innovative by the
other standards also. The indicators of R&D effort, on the other hand,
show very little relation to the production of innovative drugs. The drug
quality measures, also with one exception, are positively related to innova-
tiveness, as is efficiency. That is, the least innovative cc*panies spent
the most per dollar of new drug sales. Size of firm varied directly with
innovativeness, quality of new drugs introduced, and R&D efficiency.
Of course, these figures andthedescription of the companies is based
on the assumption that R&D has as its only purpose the development of new
or innovative drugs. Since the firms may have other objectives of R&D in
mind (safety, quality, dosage reduction, process improvements, development
of non-prescription drugs), what appears here as inefficiency or lack of
innovativeness may really reflect a smaller interest in innovation and a
concentration on other objectives.
C- 31-
IV. Impact of New Drugs on Foreign Investment
As an innovative drug for a rare disease may be less important to a
company than an innovative drug for a common disease, wweight each drug
byits 1972 sales in the U.S. Lack of data precludes ourlookingat sales
in the U.S. prior to 1972. Although cons'ptior. of specific drugs and types
of drugs differs considerably among countries ofsimilar cliTr.ate and per
capita income,1 lack of data also precludes our looking at foreign sales
of specific drugs.
Theempirical work on multinational firms.haz stressed differences
amongindustries. Vernon, for example, allocated his 187 multinational
firmsamong23 industries and found thattheir importance in the 1966 sales
of the entire industry ranged from85 percent (motor vehicles and equipment)
to4 percent (pDirting and publishing); the 15 multinational drug firms in
hissample acounted for 77 percent of all sales in 1966 by U.S. drug com-
panies.2 He ex:ilained these differences by arguing that in comparison with
other firms the multinational firms are "of extraordinary size and high
profitability, corritted to activities that involve therelatively heavy
use of skilled manpower and ofadvertising outlays."3 The pharmaceutical
1Cooper compared the prices of 1,042 drugs sold in 1964 inGreat Britain
.d at least one of the following: Germany, Italy, France, and Spain; only
50 drugs were sold in all five countries. Antibiotics accounted for 23 per-
cent of pharmacydrug sales in Great Britain in1964, compared to 15 percent
inthe U.S., 8 percent in France, and 4 percent in Germany. Michael H. Cooper,
op.cit., pp. 141, 132.
2Raymond Vernon,Sovcreignty at Bay(NewYork: Basic Books, 1971), p. 14.
3Ibid., p. 12.—32—
C
industryspendsa great deal on both R&D andadvertising.R&D expenditures
fluctuated between seven andninepercent of the value of pharmaceutical
shipments in the 1960's,1 compared with twopercentof sales for the average
firm in Vernon's group of 187 multinationals. Advertising expenditures in
the U.S. drug companies, as shown in column (5) of Table 111-1, are well
above the three percent of sales of Vernon's 187 multinational firms.
Will these threevariables2——size,emphasis on research, andemphasis
on advertising-—explain differences in foreign investment within the drug
industry? Table 111-1 shows total corporate sales in 1272, total U.S. drug
sales. in 1972, U.S. sales in 1972 of innovative drugs, U.S. sales in 1972
1Drug Statistical Handbook (Washington: FDA, 1973), p. 10.
2Many of these companies also sell "proprietary drugs," and many of them
alsosellitems other than drugs. So we cannot derive profit data on the
drugs in our list frompublisheddata on company profits. The advertising
data aremainlyfor ethical pharmaceuticals. Some of the R&D personnel may
be for products other than the drugs we are considering. There is also the
problem wit'profit data that reported profit rates may not be .relevant for
nanagerIdecisions, since current accounting practice treats expenditures
on research ariddevelopmentas a current expense rather than as an investment.
See T. R. Stauffer, "Profitability in a Discovery-Intensive Industry: Phar-
maceuticals," (paper read at the Conference on Drug Development and Marketing,
The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington,
July 197+).
3Drug sales aretodrug stores and civilian hospitals and exclude vitamins
andnon-prescriptiondrugs; these latter twocategoriesare included in Table I-i.—33—
ofnew drugs,thenumber of research and development (RED) personnel per
milliondollars of U.S. drag sales, and promotion expensez asa percentage
of U.S. drug sales.
Preliminaryanalysis showed that the Latin American experience was so
different fromthatof the rest of the world that one obtained no signifi-
cantresultsby using combined data. One might expect that result by looking
atTable IV-l. Latin America has 35 percent of the manufacturing subsidi-
ariesand has more than allof Europe, eventhough Western Europe has a
higher per capita income and a larger population.1 So throughout the regres-
sion analysis we report results separately for Latin America and for the
rest of the world.
It is conceivable that total corporate sales might influence a drug
company's propensity to establish foreign drug plants. For example,
Lederle and A. Robinseach had about $100 million of U.S. drug sales
in 1972, but Lederle is partofAmerican Cyanarnid, which had worldwide
sales in 1972 of $l.L billion. Lederle may acquire from its parent cor-
poration knowledge about foreign investment opportunities.
TableIV-2 shows the ordinary least squares regressionsin which the
dependentvariable is the number of non-Latin Americancountries2 with
11n 1970 Latin America had about 280 million persons andWestern
Europe had about 371 million persons. Per capita income intheaverage
Latin American country was about one-fourth that of Western Europe. Data
from Trends in Developing Countries (Washington: World Bank, 1973).
2Datafornumber of countries with manufacturing plants in 1959 and
1970,forLatin America and non-LatinAmerican countries, areshown in
TableA-2.-33a-
TableIV-1
Nwither of U.S.Drug Firrs with At Least One
Manufacturing Plant in Area
DateofEsta1isht.eflt of First Plant
Priorto 1950 1950-19591960-1970Total
(1) (2) (3) (4)
.Canada 10 6 20
Europe 7 41 64 112
E.E.C.1 0 25 35 60
U.K. 7 8 3 18
Other 0 8 26 34
LatinAmerica 6
Argentina 1 11 4 16
Brazil 0 11 3 14
Mexico
14. 12 5 21
Other 1 31 .43 75
Australiaand
New Zealand 3 12 7 22
Asia & MiddleEast 0 21 38 59
Philippines 0 8 3 11
Other 0 13 35 48
Africa 2 7 13 22
SouthAfrica 2 7 7 16
Other 0 0 6 6
TOTAL 28 152 181 361
1Be1gi'zn, France, Germany, Italy,Luxembourg,Netherlands.
Source: Questionnaires.-33b-
TableIv—2
Regressions for 1970 Countries Outside Latin America
(T-Ratiosin Parentheses)
(1) (2) (3) (LI.)
.1.972Worldwide Sales .007 —.0004 —.001 ——
(2.34)1(—.33) (—.71)
1972 U.S. DrugSales .005 .03 .63 .03
(.29) (1.99)2(1.34) (2.37)
R&D/1972 U.S. Drug Sales .33 —— —_ ——
(.54)
Promotion/1972 U.S.Drug Sales53.9 —- —-
(.98)
PercentNew Sales, 1972
—— —9.72 —— —10.6
(—1.01) (—1.23)
Percent Innovative Sales, 1972
—— — .572 ——
(—.38)
PercentAntibiotic a1es, 1972 .02
(.04)
R2 .36 .25 .21 .23
F 1.65 1.85 1.06 2.912














manufacturingplants in 1970; Table IV-3 showsthe ordinaiy least squares
regressions in which the dependentvariable is the number of Latin AtneriCar
countries with manufacturing plants in 1970;Tabl IV—4 and IV-5 show the
corresponding regressions when all variables areexpressed as iogarithrns)
Co1u (1) of Tables IV-2 through IV-5 uses asindependent variables
two measuresof firmsize(total corporate sales in1972and U.S. drug
sales in1972), R&D personnel as a percentage of U.S. drugsalesin 1972,
and promotionalexpenses as a percentage ofu.s.drugsalesin 1972.Neither
LatinAmericanregressionis significant at the 10 percent level; the loga-
rithmicequation for non-Latin America issignificant,2 andthe only sign!-
ficantvariableis the value of 1972 total corporate sales.Since R&D
personnel is a maseofinput, it is perhaps not surprisingthat itfail5
to explain foreign investment.
Column (2) of Tables IV-2 tough IV-5 uses asindependent variables
the twomeasuresof firm size andtheshare of 1972 U.S. drug sales accounted
for byallthe new drugs--single entity andcombinationS__intlfoducedin the
U.S.bythe firmbetween1963 arid1972.The sample size cannowbe increased
from17to 21. Again none of the Latin Americanregressions is significant.
Thelogarithmic regression forthe non-Latin American countries is significant,
1Whendoing the lo;arithrnic regressions, we letinnovative sales be
$.l million when they were in fact zero andletpercentage of drug sales
accounted for by antibiotics be .1 percent whenit wasinfact zero.
21ntherest of this section, unlessotherwisestated, significant
means that the observed coefficientwould occur by chance five percent of
the time ifthe true coefficient were zero.
,Table IV-3
Regressions for 1970 Latin Ai'nericanCountries
(T—Ratios in Parentheses)
(1) (2) (3)
2.972 Worldwide Sales .001 —.001 —.001
(.21) (—.98) (—.95)
1972 U.S. DrugSales —.003 .006 —.003
(—.18) . (.56) (—.26)
R&D/1972 U.S. Drug Sales .06 —— —-
(.11)
Prorriotion/1972 U.S. DrugSales -29.6 ——
(—.58)
Percent New Sales, 1972 —— —.48 ——
(—.07)





F .12 .67 1.40
n 17 21 211Significant at 5 percent level
Table IV-4

























1972 U.S. Drug Sales
R&D/l972 U.S. DrugSales
Pronotion/1972 U.S. Drug Sales
Percent New Sales, 1972
Percent Innovative Sales, 1972












































Regressions for Log 1970 Latin American Countries
(T-Ratios in Parentheses)
(1) (2) (3)
Log 1972 Worldwide Sales .25 .OLI —.08
(.72) (.17) (—.39)
Log 1972 U.S. Drug Sales .02 .1.11 .23
(.Ot1) (1.66) (.81)
Log R&D/1972 U.S. Drug Sales
(—.10)
Log Pronotion/l972U.S. Drug Sales -.15 —-
(—.21)
Log Percent New Sales, 1972 —— —.16 ——
(—.69)
Log Percent Innovative Sales, 1972 —— —.003
(.02)
Log Percent Antibiotic Sales, 1972 .07
(.97)
R2 .07 .16 .18
F .21 1.06 .90
17 21 23.— Q -I—
J
aridsi:eas measured by 1972 U.S.drug sales isthe only significant
variable.
Column (3) of Tables IV-2 throughIV-5 usesasan independent van-
able the twomeasuresof firm size andtheshare of 1972 U.S. drug sales
accounted for by the innovative drugsintroduced in the U.S. by each firm
between 1963 and1972.We also include as an independentvariable the share
of U.S. 1972 drugsalesaccounted for byantibiotics.1 Throughout the
world,antibiotics are consideredthe twonder .drugs" of the last twenty
years.2 Many governments insist that antibioticsbe produced locally.3
As antibiotics' importance in companysales intheU.S. in 1972 ranged from
zero(for U. companies) to 45percent,the political pressures to invest
in foreign countries differs greatly amongthe drugcompanies.As shown
in TableIV-9,firms that have large antibiotic salestend to have large
innovative sales, but the relationship isweak. Againneitherof the Latin
American regressions is significant. Fornon-Latin American countries, the
logarithmic equation is again significant,with the firm's 1972 U.S. drug
sales being the only significantvariable.
Asthefirm's total corporate sales tends not tobe significant, we
showin columns (ti)and(5)of Tables IV-2 andIV—'4the regressions omitting
1Thesedata are shown in Table A-2.
2T ranquilizerS are a "wonder drug" only intherich countries, which
devote moreresourcesto the treatment of mental iUness.
3Onlythe final processing is. done locally.A drug company will have
afewfermentationplants to serve manyprocessing plants.— 36—
itas a variable. Thisallows us to increase the samplesize to 22.1
The logarithmic equations are againsignificant, andthesize of the firm
is a significant variable.
While the coefficients on new drugsales and
oninnovativedrugsales are negative, they are not significantly
different
fromzeroat the 10 percent level.
The importance of firm size for explainingforeign investment outside
Latin America partially confirmsHorst's econometric analysis of 1,191U.S.
anufacturiflg firms. He found that R&Deffort arid advertising effortdid
not explain whether a firmwasa multinational. Heconcluded that "once
interiridusti'Ydifferences are washed out, the onlyinfluence of any separate
significance is firmsize."2
It is perhaps not surprising thatthe variables measuring the impor—
twice of the firm's new drugs arenot significant intheregressions reported
in Tables IV-2 through IV-5. The newdrugs are for the period1963-1972.
The dependent variable in thesetables is the number of countrieswith plants
in1970; many ofthese plants wereopened up in the1950's. So in Tables
IV—6through IV-8 we present the regressionresults using as the dependent
variablethe change between 1959and1970 in the number of coun.trieswith
a manufacturing plant.Since this change was zero for LatinAmerica for
1Parke-DaviS was absorbed by Warner-Lainbert in1970.While we have
data onParke-DaViS'S1972U.S. drugsales, we do not have data onParke-
Davis'sworldwide 1972 sales.
Horst, "Firm andIndustry Determinants of theDecision to
Invest Abroad: An Empirical Study,"Review of Economics and Statistics,
5 (Augt 1972), p. 261.—36a-
Table IV-6















1Significant at 5 percent level





Percent New Sales, 1972
Percent Innovative Sales, 1972





















—— —— —— ——
2.12
(.07)
R2 •L3 .32 .33 .30 .32
F 2.21 2.702 1.96 L1.1L+ 2.882—37-
many firms, we do not present logarithmic regressiorisffor Latin America.
Column(1) ofTables IV-6 through IV-2uses asindependent variables
thetwomeasuresof firmsize,the importance of RgD, and the importance
of promotional expenses. Again none of the equations is significant.
Column (2) of Tables IV-6 throughIV-8uses the two measures of firm
size and the importance of new drugs; column (3) uses the two measures of
firm size and the importance of innovative drugs. Again noneofthe Latin
American regressions is significant. The logarithmicnon-Latin American
regression is significant, and firm size as measured by 1972 U.S. drug
sales is significant.
Concentrating only on non-Latin America, we consider columns (Li-)and
(5) of Tale.s IV-6 and IV-8. In terms of R2, the logarithmic equations
are superior arid are both significant at the 1 percent level. The loga-
rithmic regression using the share of innovative drugs issomewhatsuperior
to the one using the share of new drugs--column (5) as compared to column
(k) of Table IV-8--in terms of (.52 versus .e2). Throughout the analysis
the coefficients for the importance of new drugs arid the importance of
innovative drugs have been negative, but their significance levels have not
leen overwhelming. In the regressions shown incolumn(5) of Table IV-8,
the coefficients of the independent variables are different from zero at
the following levels of significance: size of firm—-i percent, importance
of innovative drugs--15 percent, importanceofantibiatics—-9 percent.
With this sample size, the large degree of multicollinearity (see Table IV-9)





Log U.S. 1972 Drug Sales (1) 1.00
Log Innovative U.S. Sales as
Percent of Total U.S. Drug Sales (2) 1.00 .32
Log AntibioticU.S.Sales as
Percent of Total U.S. Drug Sales (3)
1.00
('4) (5) (6)
U.S. 1972 Drug Sales ('4) 1.00 .'42 .57
InnovativeU.S. Sales as Percent
of Total U.S. Drug Sales (5) 1.00 .26
U.S. Sales as Percent
of Total U.S. Drug Sales (6) 1.00—36b-
Table IV-7
ègiessibns farAdditionalLatin AmericanCountriesin 1960's
CT—Ratios in Parentheses)
(1) (2) (3)
1972 Worldwide Sales .001 .0002 .0000
(.75) (.39) (.09)
1972U.S.Drug Sales _.00L .007 .003
(_.Lg) (1.16) (.39)
R&D11972 U.S. Drug Sales .LlL1 —- ——
(—1.58)
?rornotion/1972 U.S. Drug Sales -22.9 —-
(-.91)
Percant New Sales, 1972
—— —3.36 ——
(—.90)
Percent Innovative Sales, 1972
—— —.25
(—.05)
PercentAntibioic Sales, 1972 .02
(.52)
.2L1 .08 .06
F .93 .52 .24
n 17 21 21-36c-
Talle IV-8
Regressions for Log-of Additional Countriesin 1960's Outside Latin Americi
(T—Ratios in Parentheses)
1Significant at 1 percent level
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LogRD/1972 U.S. Drug Sales -.38
(_1.2L1)
































Inconclusion, the total nuiber of non-Latin American countries with
manufacturing plantsin1970 is positively related to the size of the
firmas measured by J.S.drugsa2.es.(Tab1IV-.The number ofiion-Latin
knericancountries with manufacturing plants first eztablished in the 1960's
is positively relatedtothe size of the firm as measured by U.S. drugsales
in l972 andtherelative importance of antibiotics' to the finn and isnega-
tivalyrelated toth relative importance of innovative drugs to the firm
(TableIV-8). We conjecture that innovative firms are moreabletoserve
1 - theseforeignmarkets via exporting from theU.S. or via 1:.censing; unrcr-
tunately,wedonot have data on exports or licensing income for all the
firms in oursample and so cannot test this part of the hypothesis.
Within Latin America neither the total number of countries withmanu-
facturing plants in i970 nor the number of countries with plants first estab-
1.ishedin the 1960's is related to anyofthe variables we measured (Tables
IV—3, IV-5, andIV-7).Noting that in the1960's 78percent of these new
plantswere established outside Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico,we feel that
the import substitution policies of the various Latin American governments2
1
See, for example, Vernon, Sovereinty at Bay,o._cit., and Raymond
Vernon, "InternationalInvestmentand International Trade in the Product
Cycle," Quarterly Journal of Economics (May 1966).
2 . .. . For'a discussion o..these oolicies, see S. Marcario, 'Protectionism
andIndustrializationin Latin America," Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 9
(March 19614), pp. 61-103, andAlbert 0. Hirschznan, "ThePolitical Economy of
Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America ,"QuarterlyJournal
of Economics, 82 (February 1968).—39—
C
werethe principaldetrnant ofthe investments by U.S. drig companies
inthe1960's, but we areunable tomeasurethesepolicies in a way that
coul4e usedin a regression.—L1O-
V.Diffusion of Individual Drugs
TableV-i shows for seven new drugs theaverage lag between the first
sale and the sale in each major world market.1 One should remember that
the first sale, as shown in column(1),did not always take place in the
U.S.The extremely snail size of the sample makes itdifficult to control
forthe company, the type of drug, andthecalendar date, andsowe usethe
data to state three conjectures rather thanto draw conclusions:
(1)the time lag for the diffusion of drugs has fallen over time in
rich countries and shows no trend in developing countries;
(2) as between rich countries and developing countries, thereisnot
much difference in the rate of diffusion;
(3) company B diffused its sole innovative drug more rapidly thanits
three imitative drugs.
To what extent does the presence of a foreign manufacturing plant
affectthe speed with which a new drug is introduced inforeign countries?
Weconjecture that the lag(inyears) between the date of first introduction
of a new drug anditsintroduction into countr,r x CL1) depends on whether
there is a manufacturing plant in country x CM), on whether country x is a
rich countryor a developing country2CR), and on whether the drug is
1Thetwocompanieskindly provided us with this information on the con-
dition that they remainanonymous.The specific drugs. were chosen by us to
be representative of the company's portfolio of single entity drugs introduced
into the U.S. between 1963 and1972;the companies did not know that we con-
sidered somedrugs as innovative and some as imitative. "Major markets" were
definedby each company.
countries are U.S., Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
fTable V-i
Average NumberofYears from Year of








































innovative or imitative (I). The three independent variables are durry
variables as follows:
M =1ifmanufacturing plantincountryx at time drug introduced
incountryx and zero if no plant
R =1ifx is a rich country andzeroif x is a developing country
I1 if drugis imitative aridzeroifinnovative.
The leastsquares regression, for n =48,is:
=1.69—.91M +.30R+ .52 I =.10
(—1.24)(.87) (1.51) F 1.60
While neither the overall regression nor anyofthe individual vari-
ablesis significant at even the 10 percent level, the regression is con-
sistent with the hypotheses that the presence of a manufacturing plant
increases the speed with which a drugisdiffused around the world and that
innovative drugs are diffused more rapidly than imitative drugs.
and South Africa. All other countries aretreatedas developing countries.INCLUDED SUBSIDIARIES OF DRUG COANIES IN SA'LE
ABEOTT—Borcherdt, Courtland Lab.

























With Manufacturing Plants as Percent
Latin America Other of U.S. 1972
1959 197019591970 Drug Sales
(1) (2) (3) (Li) (5)
abbott 2 10 5 16 18
American Home Products 3 7 6 15 10
Armour 1 2 1 2 0
Bristol Meyers 3 8 6 1Li 22
Dow 0 3 1 3 7
Johnson &Johnson 1 2 3 8 0
Lederle 5 5 13 23
Lilly 3 6 2 9 '45
Merck 7 9 17 0
Miles '4 6 2 8 0
Parke—Davis 6 7 5 13 12
Pfizer 5 8 13 214 27
Iichardson-Merrefl 3 3 13 15 0
A. H.Robins 0 3 0 0
Sa1e 1 '# 1 5 0
Schring-P1ough 3 7 14 9 27
rSmith Kline S French 1 1 9 10 0
SuThb 6 8 5 12 23
Sterling 16 18 5 10 0
Upjohn 1 2 0 6 18
U.S.V. 0 2 0 '4 0
Warner-Lambert 2 9 9 19 0
Sources: Columns (l)—() -Questionnaires
Column (5)-basedonIMS Americadata